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THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  TRADERELATIONS 
BETWEEN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 
ADDRESS  BY  SIR  ROY  DENMAN 
HEAD  OF  THE  DELEGATION  OF  THE  COMMISSION 
OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
NATIONAL  FOREIGN  TRADE  COUNCIL,  INC. 
NEW  YORK,  OCTOBER  15,  1984 Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  I  count it a  great honour 
and privilege to have  the  chance of  sharing with this distinguished 
audience  some  thoughts  on  the  trade_ relationship between the United 
States and  the European Community. 
Let me  do  so with  some  basic and questioning  observations.  I 
find travelling round this country that in this free  and  dynamic 
society a  number of awkward  questions are frequently raised.  Has 
not America devoted too much  time  and worry  to its external 
relations?  Are not foreigners  an ungrateful  and  unrewarding lot? 
With its huge  natural resources why  cannot America manage  on its 
own?  Linked  to this is a  second question.  Is the relationship 
with Europe really all that important.  Is this not an  obsession 
of  the old East Coast establishment?  Has  there not been  a 
tremendous  shift in the United States from  the East Coast to the 
South  and  the West.  Is not the future across  in the Pacific 
rather than with Europe.  These questions may  be  awkward 
but they need  to be  answered because  they are  fundamental  to any 
assessment of  the United States•  role in the world. 
So  let us  take the United States•  involvement in the rest of  the 
world.  What  strikes a  foreigner  living here as fascinating is 
the sea  change which has  taken place in the last fifteen years. 
For  something like one  hundred years after the Civil War 
American  involvement in foreign  trade as measured  by  the percentage 
of this againstitsGross National Product never  rose  above  3  to  4 
percent.  In the 1970s it exploded.  Foreign trade now  accounts for -2-
some  12  percent of American  GNP.  One-fiftb of American  production 
is exported,  two-thirds of its wheat.  Between  1970  and  1980  the 
value of  US  agricultural exports  jumped  from  $7  billion to $41 
billion.  The us  share of the total volume  of world agricultural 
exports increased  from  25  to  39  percent.  The  us  share of world 
exports of manufactures  rose  from  17  percent in 1978  to  21  percent 
in 1981.  So  foreign trade is now  one of the basic factors in 
American prosperity in a  way  it never was  until  some  fifteen years 
ago. 
Then  the Atlantic relationship.  Is it still important?  I  would 
say yes  for  three basic reasons.  In the first place the European 
Community  has  consistently been your best customer.  We  can 
legitimately reckon ourselves as  one  customer because our  ten 
Member  States form  a  customs  union.  In  1982  we  took  22  percent 
of American  exports.  We  are your best customer overall - and 
the American  farmers best customer.  Total trade between  the EC 
and  the  US  in all products last year  amounted  to  some  $100  billion. 
As  Secretary Shultz  said in Brussels last year,  "We  must be doing 
something right". 
The  second point is wider.  The  European  Community  and  the United 
States are the biggest actors on  the world  trading stage.  Last 
year the Community  accounted for  something like one-fifth of world 
trade,- the United States  something like 16  percent.  Together we 
account for more  than one-third of world trade.  This  gives us 
both  a  historic responsibility for  the maintenance of the open 
world  trading system.  If - which  I  do  not for  a  moment  believe -
the shutters came  clanging down  across  the Atlantic in some  mad -3-
escalation of  trade restrictions then the one  world trading  system 
on which  the prosperity of  the West  has  been  based  for  the last 
thirty-five years will begin to crumble  and with prosperity going 
out of  the window  we  would  be  back to the dreadful wasteland of 
the 1930s with poverty and  unemployment  in every street and  the 
terrible political ghosts which  these can ·conjure up. 
And  the third on  the Atlantic relationship is wider still.  However 
important  trade is in our relationship no-one  should ever  forget 
that our  relationship is fundamentally political.  I  had  the 
privilege a  few  months  ago  of dining with the American  Bar 
Association in Carpenters Hall in Philadelphia.  And  it was  very 
moving  for  a  European  to reflect that in that elegant hall  two 
hundred  and  ten years ago  some  worried English settlers got 
together to discuss their relationship with  the mother  country 
and  launch  in doing  so  one  of  the greatest adventures  in nation-
building in  the history of  the world.  And  launch it on  the basis 
of  shared democratic beliefs and  traditions - which  are bonds which 
link us still today.  No  European if he  looks  back  over the last 
forty years  can forget Marshall Aid,  the Berlin airlift, our 
banding  together for  the defence  of  freedom  in the setting up  of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,  and  the historic and 
generous decision of  the United States  a  quarter of  a  century ago 
to support - despite all the fears  of  businessmen  and  farmers  here -
the beginnings of the unification of Europe. 
So  the Atlantic relationship remains vital.  What  are the 
arguments  on  the broad  economic  front across  the Atlantic.  Let me 
set these out under  four  headings.  First the macro-economic  front. 
What  is significant for  a  European is the strength of the dollar, -4-
the rush of  imports  into this country,  the ballooning trade 
deficit,  high interest rates and  a  flow of capital badly needed 
in the rest of the world  to the United States.  Certainly this 
is not all darkness  and despair.  A strong dollar encourages 
European  exports to the United States.  And  in any considerations 
of investment in the United States the  safe haven factor is a 
powerful  one.  But we  are still left with worries principally on 
the encouragement to protectionist pressures here which  a  highly-
valued  currency - as in any  country - gives rise.  I  do  not think 
it would  be right for us  to givelecturesto the United States 
Administration about how  to conduct their economic  policy or to 
get into an  argument about the cause of high interest rates and  the 
level of the dollar.  We  have not always in Europe  been brilliant 
at managing our own  economic affairs.  But we  are entitled as 
friends  and  trading partners to point to  some  of these  phenomena 
and  to point out the dangers  for us  both.  Because like steam in 
a  boiler once protectionist pressures in any country get beyond 
a  certain point damage  can result for all around.  So  we  hope 
that some  of these problems  - and  obviously the budget deficit 
is an  essential one  - can be dealt with as  soon as possible. 
Then  there are certain general areas of legislation that concern 
us.  We  have  been greatly worried  by the worldwide  unitary taxation 
system practiced by  twelve of the fifty States of the Union.  We 
do  not· think that a  system of taxation which takes  revenue  from 
operations worldwideof  a  company which  happens  to have  a  branch 
in the  United States is either fair or an  encouragement to invest-
ment in this country.  I  do  not think that American corporations 
operating in Europe would welcome it if the European authorities -5-
began  to tax  them on their income  in this country and world wide. 
So  we  hope  that the  individual States will begin to see  - as 
Oregon  has  - that this is not in their interest. 
Then  the Export Administration  Act~  What  we  have been arguing 
here is not a  parochial concern.  We  do not disagree that there 
are high-technology exports to the Soviet bloc which  any  sensible 
person should prohibit.  Where  we  have disagreements as  to the 
sensitivity of the equipment there is a  mechanism in Paris where 
as  friends  and allies we  can argue this out.  What  we  object to 
is the  concept that instructions could be  given to European 
subsidiaries or customers of American  firms  ordering them  to 
stop trading.  Let me  put this the other way  round.  Supposing 
we  - the Europeans  - were  to come  to you  and  say we  disagree with 
American  foreign policy towards  country  X.  We  are therefore 
instructing all American  subsidiaries of European  firms  to stop 
trading in certain areas.  Coming  from  a  country which lost a  lot 
of tea in Boston harbour  some  years back  I  can imagine the reply. 
Thirdly agriculture.  Here  there are two  separate arguments.  And 
these must be  seen against the general  background that with imports 
into the  EC  annually of  $7  billion of agricultural goods  from  the 
United States leaving the  US  with a  surplus of  $5  billion we  are 
the American  farmers best customer.  The first argument is about 
agricultural export subsidies.  Here  there is the general myth 
that Europe is subsidising its farmers  out of its mind,  bankrupting 
itself in order to cheat American  farmers  of their access  to world 
markets.  The  truth is different.  Subsidies are not a  unique -6-
European  phenomenon.  The  total Community  budget last year 
amounted  to  some  $23  billion - less than one percent of Community 
GNP.  Of  this something like $15  billion went on agricultural 
price support.  In the United States according to  ~ report of the 
Council of Economic Advisers,  Federal expenditure on price 
support  (and  this does  not include such  items as subsidies to 
Californian water consumers)  amounted to $18.9 billion with another 
$9.4 billion going  for  PIK. 
So  subsidies for agriculture - whether Adam  Smith would  have  approved 
or not - and  he would  have done poorly in the primaries on both 
sides of  the Atlantic - are a  fact of life.  This  the  US  and its 
trading partners recognised in the last major  round  of trade 
negotiations,  the Tokyo  Round,  which  finished in 1979.  What  we 
agreed  then was  that agricultural export subsidies  should be 
permitted providing they did not lead to a  country taking more 
than an  equitable share of world trade.  This is a  country rich 
in attorneys,  and many  of  them  ask me  what you mean  by equitable. 
This is like the old  joke about defining an elephant.  Difficult 
to draft the definition,  but if one enters the  room  at a  trot one 
can usually guess what kind of animal is involved.  Take  the 
figures  for wheat  and wheat  flour which  account for  something 
like one-fifth of American exports.  What  happened  to our exports 
from  the Community  in the 1970s?  They went  up  from  10  to 14 percent 
of world  trade.  Sure,  that was  an increase.  American exports went· 
up  from  34  to 46  percent.  I  do  not make  this point in any  accusatory 
sense but to demonstrate  that we  can hardly on  this basis be 
accused in Europe of either breaking the world  trade rules or 
hogging  the world market. -7-
Then,  corn gluten.  It is being said that in some  misguided way 
the Community  is about to slash its imports of American  corn gluten 
in a  way  which might provoke  a  conflagration.  . Again  the truth 
is different.  We  are making  a  real attempt in Europe  to cut 
subsidies to our farmers.  We  took  some  painful decisions mainly 
in the dairy products field earlier this year.  We  are going  to 
have  a  further  go at grains early next year.  But we  cannot cut 
support to our farmers without looking at imports which  compete. 
Exports of corn gluten  from  the United States to the Community 
soared  from  700,000  tons  in 1976  to over  3 million tons  last year. 
And  this is driving out Community  wheat onto world markets  where 
it competes with American  farmers.  What  we  have  proposed is that 
we  discuss between ourselves the possibility of stabilising these 
imports.  Stabilising - not slashing - against payment  by  us  of 
compensation  to be agreed.  This is exactly what  the international 
trading rules provide.  Discussions have  been  joined in the GATT 
in Geneva  on this.  And  I  hope  as partners in a  reasonable dialogue 
we  can  come  to an  agreement. 
Fourthly industry in general.  And  here we  have  lived recently 
through  a  difficult time.  The  timing of  a  whole  range of pleas 
for additional protection during  an election period has 
confronted the Administration with  some  difficult and delicate 
decisions.  But the picture is far  from  being one of unrelieved 
gloom.  We  welcome,  for example,  the stand which  the Administration 
has  taken against steel import quotas,  the Wine  Equity Act  and  the 
Domestic Content Bill.  We  were glad that the  US  International -8-
Trade Commission did not find that the wine  and  footwear industries 
had  been injured by  imports and in the case of copper  and  steel we 
welcomed  the fact again that the Administration rejected the  ITC  _ 
recommendations  for  increased tariffs and quotas.  What  was 
important to us  here was  the preservation of the steel arrangement 
we  came  to with the Administration two  years ago whereby we  agreed 
to limit our steel exports  to the United States in return for the 
dropping of  a  range of anti-dumping  and countervailing suits.  As 
a  result of this agreement  EC  steel shipments  to the  US  fell  some 
27  percent in 1983.  We  felt that we  had held our part of the bargain 
One  interesting development we  have  seen in all this is the active 
lobbying by American producers  and retailers in Washington in 
support of free trade and  against protectionism.  First of all of 
course your  own  efforts as  the National Foreign Trade Council. 
And  in recent months  wheat  and  corn producers  have  lobbied vigorously 
against new  textile import restrictions and  have expressed their 
disquiet about  a  number of provisions in the Wine  Equity Bill.  The 
Retail  Industry Trade Action Coalition founded  in 1984  to represent 
major department stores have been actively opposing the Administratiol 
over  new  barriers on  textile imports.  And  copper  and  steel users 
have  lobbied against ITC  recommendations  to limit imports. 
But  then  came  during the last few  weeks  a  dramatic  resurgence of 
protectionist pressures  and  the tacking on  to a  Trade Bill - which 
contained constructive proposals for  example  to continue the 
Generalised System of Preferences  - of a  whole series of protectionist 
amendments.  Two  things in particular worried us  about these -9-
attempts to make  the Trade Bill significantly protectionist. 
The first is the concept as it was  embodied in the Wine  Equity 
Bill of a  sectoral approach.  This would require the Administration 
to establish an  inventory of barriers to  US  exports in one particular 
sector - that of wine  - then after consultation  witt Congress  to 
take action.  But the whole  of the liberalisation of post-war 
trade has  been  based on  the concept of overall reciprocity.  The 
tariff negotiations of the post-war era would  not have been 
possible if everyone  had  insisted on direct reciprocity in each 
particular sector.  Supposing that the European  Community were to 
adopt  a  similar approach for areas where  there is a  trade imbalance 
in favour  of  the United States.  I  am  not of course saying the 
Community  has  any  such intention.  But  I  make  the point simply to 
underline the danger of the United States setting such  a  precedent. 
The  second main area is that of provisions which would  in fact 
rewrite unilaterally the international trading rules.  For  example, 
there was  at one  stage in the Trade Bill a  section which would 
amend  present US  laws  on  anti-dumping and  countervailing duties 
to extend the definition of an  "industry"  to include  raw material 
producers.  If this  amendment  had  been adopted it would  have set 
very dangerous  precedents.  EC  producers of basic agricultural 
products would  be  able to join with producers of the finished 
products to claim injury  from  imports of the latter from  the 
United States.  If this precedent were in logic extended to 
trade in industrial products  the end  result would  be  new  and major 
restrictions on world  trade.  The  same consideration applies to the 
provisions  in one version of the Bill, which would deal with -10-
"upstream subsidization"  and  "downstream  dumping"  - definitions 
of dumping  and  subsidies much  broader  than in present GATT  Codes 
on Anti-dumping,  Subsidies and Countervailing Duties to which  the 
US  is a  party. 
Either of these roads,  sectoral reciprocity or simply rewriting 
unilaterally the international trading rules would  be  bound  to 
produce pressure on other trading partners to take  a  similar line. 
This  could  lead to a  major unravelling of the trade liberalisation 
achieved since the war  and  to fundamental  damage  to world 
prosperity. 
As  it happened  the Trade Bill which  emerged  from  the Congress  and 
which has  been sent to the President for  signature avoided 
the most damaging of these provisions.  We  appreciate the efforts 
made  by  the Administration and  by  a  number of those in Congress  to 
secure this result.  Having  said that we  are bound  to say that 
there are still some  things in the Bill which worry us.  One  is 
the definition of the wine industry which is not in accordance with 
the international trading rules as  embodied in the  GATT  Codes  on 
Subsidies  and  Dumping.  And  there are a  number of other provisions 
e.g.  on  subsidies which  concern us.  I  would myself  expect that 
we  would  need  to raise these questions with our American colleagues 
in the GATT.  And we  have made it quite clear that if any  action 
were  to be  taken  by the United States under this law against for 
example our exports of wine which  was  not in accordance with the 
international trading rules  then we  would feel  bound  to retaliate. -11-
So  as we  enter the last few months  of  1984  we  can tell ourselves 
that we  have  so far escaped disaster but that there is still 
quite a  lot to worry us.  And  having said that it seems  to me 
clear that our difficulties in 1985  are not going to go  away 
and  they may  even get worse.  Even if major and painful decisions 
to deal with the budget deficit are made  quickly they will take 
time to take effect.  And  if interest rates continue to be high 
and if foreign investors continue to think,  as  is likely,  the 
United States  a  very desirable place to invest money  in the 
dollar will continue high,  the trade deficit will continue to 
rise and protectionist pressures will abound.  There is in every 
country a  feeling that what one  does  oneself in trade is fine, 
what the other fellow does  amounts  to unfair trade practices.  An 
old British friend of mine once  spent  some  time  complaining to me 
about  the wickedness  of foreigners  in dumping  on  the British 
market.  I  asked him after some  time whether  he  ever dumped  himself. 
Nonsense,  he  said,  I  export at a  loss in the national interest. 
But  a  situation whre  there is a  flood of imports  and  exchange 
rate levels make it difficult to compete  encourages  this illusion 
and  increases the pressures for protectionist action. 
But, it will be said,  cannot these pressures be contained by  a 
new  round  of multinational trade negotiations.  There has  been 
a  great deal of talk about this possibility.  The  European 
Community is not opposed to it.  But as we  found  in the four 
year long  Kennedy  Round  in the 1960s  and  the six year long Tokyo -12-
Round  in the  1970s worldwide  negotiations on this scale are not 
quickly or easily organised.  There will be  a  meeting in Geneva 
next month  to assess  the results of the  two-year working 
programme  started by the  GATT  Ministerial meeting in November  1982· 
And  we  have  suggested  a  meeting of senior officials in Geneva 
next year to consider the various possibilities for  future  action 
including a  new  round.  But having been in the business  some  time 
we  think it quite essential that before we  start a  new  round  we 
should  be clear on what precisely we  are going to discuss  and  that 
we  have  the right players on board.  Otherwise we  would  risk a 
failure which  could set back  the cause of trade liberalisation 
by  some  years. 
So  1985  is going to be difficult enough.  And  1986  may  not be much 
better.  For there are bound  to be fluctuations  in the rate of 
growth of  ~he United  States economy.  And  a  downward  fluctuation 
even of a  mild kind could make  the picture I  have  sketched out 
rapidly worse. 
All this means  that holding the line against protectionism in 
the next  two critical years will be  an exceedingly difficult 
task.  I  am  confident that there is enough  statesmanship and 
courage  on both sides of the Atlantic for the line to be held. 
But  just as  the price of liberty is eternal vigilance,  we  shall 
need  on both sides of the water to be especially vigilant, 
especially courageous,  especially understanding,  especially 
ingenious if we  are to preserve in two  difficult years  the one 
world  trading system on which  the prosperity of the West  has 
depended  for the last thirty years. 